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An Evaluation of 
Mergers in the U.S. 
Petroleum Industry 
This paper analyzes the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the 
profitability of both participating firms and competitor firms in the 
U.S. petroleum industry. It also identifies distinct economic conditions 
and firm specific characteristics that are correlated with the 
performance of the firm and the merger. The span of the study reaches 
from 1995-2011. It incorporates four unique, yet characteristic mergers 
of the domestic petroleum industry. The paper finds evidence that 
mergers and acquisitions affect the profitability of participating firms 
positively and competitor firms negatively. This study also provides 
insight into how uniform mergers and acquisitions in this industry may 
truly be. 







 The U.S. Petroleum industry has experienced extensive restructuring throughout its 
history. The frequency of mergers and acquisitions within U.S. oil corporations creates a 
prime opportunity for examining the repercussions of these industry reorganizations. This 
paper utilizes four transactions to assess how restructuring affects both the profits of 
firms partaking in the transaction and the profits of rival firms. Furthermore, it 
investigates the specific economic and firm characteristics that may be correlated with the 
performances of the firms and their mergers and acquisitions. Through examination, I 
hope to isolate those factors linked with successful mergers as well as those that may be 
associated with failure. “Obtaining an understanding of how these mergers have affected 
the performance of the industry leaves us better placed to formulate appropriate policy in 
anticipation of future mergers” (Hyde, 2002). Thus, by determining the driving forces of 
previous merger performance and their overall industry effect, this research may offer 
insights for analyzing future petroleum mergers. 
 Over the past 17 years, petroleum firms have consistently traded assets, acquired 
companies, and merged with one another in order to respond to technological changes, 
globalization, shifts in competition, alterations in financial industry dynamics, and 
repeated oil price shocks (Weston, 2002). Modern merger and acquisition theory holds 
that motivations for such transactions are in one sense, all of the same nature. That is, one 
group must believe that the target company can, in some way, be worth more than it 
currently is or than “the company’s owners believe [it to be]. No merger will take place 
unless this condition is fulfilled” (Waldman and Jensen, 105). Further, Waldman and 
Jensen also postulate that the unique, intricate details behind the public scene of mergers 
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allow theory to yield seven major reasons for their occurrence. These include, obtaining 
market power, acquiring efficiency gains, existing financial motives, reducing risk, 
building “empires”, failing firms, and ageing owners. Regardless of the specific reason, 
empirical evidence suggests that “around the time of a merger [completion] the acquired 
firm experiences a significant increase in [expected profitability]” (Waldman and Jensen, 
111). This is often accompanied by a zero change for acquiring firms, as they typically do 
not experience any significant, immediate profit at the time of the merger. Still, this sums 
to a positive net change. My analysis hopes to determine whether such theory holds for 
the U.S. petroleum industry. Isolating the effects of oil mergers and acquisitions will 
hopefully allow me to evaluate the common, aggregate perspectives surrounding them. 
 The paper uses annual data from 1995 to 2011. I have selected ten firms to include 
in the examination throughout this seventeen-year period, focusing only on mergers and 
acquisitions that exceeded the nominal price of 5 billion dollars. Given that acquisitions 
occur so regularly within this industry, the price stipulation allows for the incorporation 
of firms that were not involved in a merger over this period, by these standards. Such 
firms will act as a control group in the regression and will allow me to measure them 
against the firms that restructured, thereby granting better ability to isolate the effects of 
mergers and acquisitions. Of the ten firms, two of them fall under this category of not 
having participated in a merger from 1995 to 2011: Sunoco Inc. and Tesoro Corp. The 
other eight firms comprise the list of those that did participate in a merger or acquisition. 
These firms include, Exxon Corp. and Mobil Corp. (ExxonMobil Corporation, 1999), 
Phillips Petroleum Co. and Conoco Inc. (ConocoPhillips, 2002), Chevron Corp. and 
Unocal Corp. (Chevron Corporation, 2005), and Valero Energy Corp. and Premcor Inc. 
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(Valero Energy Corporation, 2005).
1
 In each case, the former was the primary or 
acquiring firm of the transaction, while the latter was the secondary or target firm. 
 This paper focuses on large corporations in order to abstract from a wider range of 
specific firm-related factors that influence the restructuring of smaller petroleum 
companies. Unlike the transactions within my analysis, these smaller mergers and 
acquisitions may lack the ability to stimulate a powerful effect on other firms or the 
industry. Thus, this paper investigates the mergers and acquisitions of larger, more 
influential corporations whose success is usually determined by common factors of 
production efficiency, coordination, and marketing.  
Previewing my econometric results, I find significant evidence that participating 
in a merger does indeed improve the profitability of the new firm. The results show that 
while the variable indicating the initial occurrence of a merger may be negative, the 
majority of the merger effect is likely captured by the lagged merger variable. This 
variable measures the effect of the merger or acquisition around the time its 
conglomeration would be completed, in the year following the transaction. This 
subsequent year appears to have a statistically significant, large, and positive effect on the 
profitability of the participating firm. The gains seem to outweigh other negative effects 
and thereby, indicate mergers increase profitability. I believe the overall robustness of my 
results is enough to conclude that these mergers have a positive effect on the profitability 
of participating firms. 
 My principal specification also yielded further evidence of how mergers and 
acquisitions affect the profitability of rival firms. My results suggest that when the largest 
                                                        
1 See Appendix A for a timeline of the 17-year period and a summary of each merger within the sample. 
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petroleum corporations partook in mergers, the restructuring had a very negative effect 
on the profitability of competing firms, and possibly the industry as a whole. Yet, when 
smaller firms participated in these transactions, the effect on competitors was less 
significant and negative. My specification was clearly able to isolate evidence of distinct, 




  Despite the aforementioned merger and acquisition theory that such restructuring 
sums to positive effects, empirical studies of such transactions in the oil industry have 
found contradictory evidence. Charles E. Hyde’s (2002) analysis of Australian petroleum 
mergers, for instance, found no evidence of mergers or acquisitions having a statistically 
significant effect on profitability. It concluded that while mergers may enhance market 
power, higher profitability was not achieved as the gains were offset by exacerbated 
managerial inefficiency. The inefficiencies likely arise from complications within the 
process of integrating two large corporations. The analysis did, however, find some 
evidence that suggested the enhanced market power stemming from mergers was 
associated with a decline in petroleum industry profitability (Hyde, 2002). Thus, as a firm 
increased its share of the market through a merger or acquisition, the new power the firm 
obtained made it harder for rival firms and the industry to compete. Industry profitability 
thereby declined on a wide scale. 
 At the same time, several case studies have produced findings that would support 
the notion of an aggregate positive effect stemming from oil mergers and acquisitions. J. 
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Fred Weston’s case study (2003) examines the largest oil industry merger ever 
completed: Exxon and Mobil’s consolidation. The two corporations elected to merge as a 
result of the potential synergy and efficiency that could be achieved. Their combination 
raised revenue, strengthened market share, advanced technological ability, and decreased 
production costs. The two fit so well together that Weston estimates their initial synergy 
of $2.8 billion eventually soared to approximately $4.6 billion. The ExxonMobil merger 
provides evidence to counter Hyde’s conjectures. In fact, Weston finds that the nine 
major oil industry mergers in the U.S. from 1998 to 2001 were all “value increasing for 
acquirers as well as targets.” This paper attempts to verify if mergers are indeed this 
beneficial, or if Weston’s approach and abbreviated time period may have biased his 
results. 
 My paper proposes that mergers and acquisitions carry implications not only for the 
participating firms but, also, for numerous competitor or rival firms. The Federal Trade 
Commission seems to agree with my hypothesis as it has “reviewed every significant 
petroleum industry merger since 1981. [Furthermore, it] has taken enforcement action 
against 15 major petroleum mergers that would [have] likely resulted in significant 
[competition] reductions.” In 11 of these cases, the FTC required major divestitures of 
assets before the merger was permitted. In the other four, the transactions were either 
abandoned or blocked completely. Clearly, these mergers and their consequences occupy 
a crucial, influential niche within the American economy and deserve to be thoroughly 
monitored and studied. 
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Prior to beginning my examination of this influential niche, taking previous theory, 
studies, and findings into account has led me to hypothesize that:  
(i) Mergers and acquisitions have a positive effect on participating firm 
profitability. 
(ii) There are economic and firm specific characteristics that help explain the 
performance of the firm and of such transactions. 
Furthermore, even as governmental oversight looks to prevent mergers or acquisitions 
from having profound economic effects on the industry, I hypothesize that: 
(iii) Such restructuring still has a negative effect on rival firm profitability. 
 
Methodology 
 Providing a format for analyzing the performance of mergers and their effect on the 
on the overall domestic industry requires first establishing a proxy that can be used to 
measure profitability. Many papers rely heavily on valuation metrics such as the return on 
assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. Studies of mergers and 
acquisitions are then able to illustrate the effects of restructuring on the profitability of 
both merging and non-merging firms. This paper will do the same and use two metrics in 
order to substantiate its findings. The first measure of profitability I use is the same as 
previously mentioned, the return on assets. ROA is a measure that “explicitly takes into 
account the assets used to support business activities [and] determines whether the 
company is able to generate an adequate return on these assets rather than simply 
showing robust return on sales” (Hagel, Brown, and Davison, 2010). To demonstrate how 
this proxy fluctuates over the 17-year period, Figure 1 depicts the average return on 
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assets for firms that were the acquirers in this paper’s mergers and acquisitions, firms that 
were the targets, and firms that did not participate in a merger (the vertical lines indicate 
the occurrence of a merger). This study hopes to isolate the motivations behind these 
aggregate changes in profitability. 
Figure 1: ROA 
 
  
 The second metric is return on equity (ROE), which is a ratio of net income to total 
shareholder equity. This valuation metric focuses on the return to the shareholders of the 
company, a measure of profitability that often determines the public’s willingness to 
invest in the firm. Figure 2 illustrates its aggregate fluctuations, which appear to be very 
similar to the movements of return on assets.  
To uncover specific firm characteristics that may be correlated with the 
performance of the merger, the regressions use these proxies for profitability as 
dependent variables. The explanatory variables then consist of macroeconomic indicators 
as well as firm specific characteristics. The data for all variables were obtained from the 

















statements required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and data releases from 




This paper maintains a unique data vector for each firm within the sample 
throughout the 17-year period. However, once a merger has occurred, the data points 
post-merger become identical for the two merging firms as they are now each 
representing the same company. This results in two series for every merger, one for each 
company involved; unique firm data exist before the merger and identical data after.
2
 An 




 Furthermore, to test my secondary hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions have a 
                                                        
2 Due to the face that post-merger observations are duplicated through the incorporation of two series for 
each merger (one for every firm involved), there is the potential for the results of the regression to be 
biased. In order to prevent the duplicated post-merger observations from creating such bias, this paper 
investigated a regression that doubled the weight of pre-merger observations. However, the unweighted 
results were only substantiated by the weighted regression, as the signs, sizes, and significances of the 
estimates were all consistent. 












negative effect on rival firms in the industry, I have included another model within the 
analysis. The regression is provided by equation (2):
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(1) PROFit = β0 + β1MERGit + β2MERGi, t-1 + β3POILt + β4IMPt  + β5ARCAt+ … + 
β6PRODit + β7POLTt + β8LOCit 
Where: 
PROF represents the profitability of firm, i, in year t, as measured by ROA and ROE.  
MERGit is a dummy variable that reflects the presence of a merger (0 if the merger has 
not occurred, 1 for its occurrence and every year after). According to my hypothesis, this 
variable should have a positive relationship with profitability. 
MERGi, t-1 is the same dummy variable as “MERGit”, but it is lagged one year to isolate 
the effect of mergers in the year following their occurrence (it is abbreviated as MERG1 
in the appendix). I expect the lagged variable to demonstrate the positive effects of 
mergers given that the time period allows for the corporations to solve any complications 
or inefficiencies and capitalize on their synergies.
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POIL is the percentage change in the price of a barrel of oil from the previous year. This 
variable should have a positive correlation with profitability as increased prices 
commonly lead to higher profits.
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IMP is the quantity of oil imported by the U.S. (measured in hundreds of millions of 
barrels) in year t. I expect this variable to be negatively correlated with firm profitability 
as rises in imports likely signify foreign firms and prices outcompeting domestic ones. 
ARCA is the percentage change in the ARCA Oil Index, a price-weighted index based on 
the change in stock prices of the leading companies involved in the exploration, 
production, and development of petroleum. This paper also investigated lagging the 
ARCA variable to prevent any endogeneity, but a lag did not create any significant 
difference in the results. The variable should have a positive effect on profitability, as 
increases in such stock indices are associated with industry wide gains. 
PROD measures the amount of crude oil production firm i was exposed to in year t (in 
hundreds of millions of barrels), by evaluating how much total crude oil was produced in 
the region (East, Midwest, South, Rockies, or West) that the firm was headquartered in. 
This number is then scaled (divided) by total U.S. production of oil to create a ratio 
(regional production / U.S. production); thereby making it a percentage of total U.S. 
production. The U.S. Petroleum Administration for Defense District lines are used to 
determine regional boundaries. I expect PROD to be positively correlated with 
profitability as higher exposures to production imply that firms are in an area where 
                                                        
4 Table 7 provides the results of this regression. 
5 A Bayesian Information Criterion test and an Akaike Information Criterion test each signified one lag 
was the appropriate number to include. 
6 Variables measuring the percentage change in real U.S. GDP, the change in unemployment rate, and the 
U.S. business cycle classification of year t were also previously included to measure total effects of the 
economy on profitability. The significance of POIL seemed to capture most of the variation of these 




demand is higher or production is more efficient and less costly, each raising the potential 
for profits. 
POLT is a dummy variable that reflects the political orientation of the President of the 
United States during year t (0 for Republican administrations, 1 for Democratic 
administrations). I expect this variable to have a negative effect on profitability, as 
Democratic administrations are associated with stricter marker regulation, while 
Republican ideals allow for less governing of corporations. 
LOC is a dummy variable that reflects whether or not the firm’s headquarters are located 
within the south (0 for south, 1 otherwise). The U.S. Petroleum Administration for 
Defense District lines are again used to determine the South’s boundaries. Similarly to 
the PROD variable, I hypothesize LOC will be positively correlated with profitability. 
The south has the most oil reserves in the lower 48 and is where the vast amount of 
production occurs. The high levels of production are due to efficiencies achieved from 
ease of access to resources. Thus, firms in the south likely have lower costs, larger scales 
of production, and more potential for profits. 
 
(2) PROFit = β0 + βiEQUATION (1) VARIABLESit + β2EFFECTjt   
 
Where j=1, 2, 3 
 
Where: 
EQUATION (1) VARIABLES represents the sum of independent variables listed above 
in Equation (1). 
EFFECT is the sum of dummy variables created to isolate the specific effects of the 
mergers and acquisitions (XOM=ExxonMobil, COP=ConocoPhillips, CVX=Chevron- 
Unocal in the Appendix). For instance, to isolate the ExxonMobil merger, this dummy 
variable (XOM) will be 0 before the merger occurs and 1 after it for every firm in the 
series except Exxon and Mobil, where it will be 0 throughout the 17 years. This 
withholds Exxon and Mobil from biasing the results. This method provides insight into 
how each of the four mergers specifically affected the other firms within the sample. 
However, an important notice is that there are only three effect variables for four mergers 
and acquisitions. This is due to the fact that the Valero-Premcor merger occurred during 
the same year as the Chevron-Unocal acquisition. Thus, by including a variable for each 
transaction, the regression would effectively be measuring how the two mergers 
influenced each other, as their data series would be mirror images. To prevent this, one 
variable must be dropped and only one merger effect can be measured. This paper 
selected the Chevron-Unocal merger as its size and strength is likely to have a more 
significant, influential effect. I expect most mergers to have a negative effect on the 
profitability of rival firms as consolidation likely increases participants’ market share and 
heightens industry competition. Mergers will only occur if they are expected to raise 
participants’ profits or reduce the success rate of competitors. 
 
Prior to moving into this paper’s discussion of my econometric analysis, I have 
included sample statistics in order to make my data set more transparent. Table 1 displays 
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an overall summary of the sample statistics of the dependent variables and the incidence 
of a merger variable. Taking the preliminary analysis of the data further, Table 2 includes 
the sample statistics of the dependent variables prior to mergers occurring. Table 3 then 




Variable Mean Std Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ROA 6.37 5.82 -12.59 19.82 
ROE 14.58 19.88 -169.98 58.97 
MERG .43 .49 0 1 
 
Table 2: 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ROA 4.47 4.39 -12.59 14.29 
ROE 12.27 23.46 -168.98 58.97 
 
Table 3: 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ROA 8.85 6.51 -11.44 19.82 
ROE 17.58 13.49 -29.63 38.47 
 
By testing if the means of the variable “MERG”, which indicates the occurrence 
of each merger, are equal within Table 2 and 3 (before and after the merger occurrence), I 
can better formulate a hypothesis for how mergers affect the profitability of participating 
firms. For instance, if a significant difference allows me to reject the null hypothesis that 
the means are equal, then I will have reason to believe that mergers have a non-zero 




Diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) 
Diff ≠ 0 
Pr(|T| > |t|) 
Diff < 0 
Pr(T < t) 
95% CI 
ROA 4.37 0.00** 0.00** 1.00 (2.63, 6.12) 
ROE 5.30 0.03* 0.06 0.96 (-.34, 10.96) 
Significance levels: Italics=0.10; *=0.05; **=0.01. 
                                                        
7 Appendix B contains sample statistics for the rest of the independent variables of Tables 1, 2, and 3. 
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 As demonstrated by these results, the means before and after mergers are 
significantly different. The mean post-merger appears to be significantly higher at the one 
percent level for ROA and the five percent level for ROE. Hence, mergers and 
acquisitions appear to increase the profitability of firms, thereby supporting my initial 





 To evaluate my hypotheses and answer the question of how mergers and 
acquisitions affect the profitability of participating and competitor firms, I first examined 
if the firms in my sample could be pooled together within the same regression. This used 
two bivariate specifications between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable, MERG, in order to determine how much these distinct transactions diverge from 
each other. If the aggregate effects of mergers and acquisitions were similar enough 
across the sample, pooling them together in the same regression would be informative of 
petroleum industry restructuring conformity. To test this, I began with the hypothesis that 





 = β1 for all k=1… 8. 
Ha:  At least one β1
k
 ≠ β1 
 
Given the results provided by Table 5, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are the same, even at the 10% level of significance for either dependent 
variable. Thus, the four mergers and eight firms are uniform enough to contribute to a 
common aggregate effect and can therefore be restricted to a pooled regression within the 
                                                        
8 I could not test the two control firms as their inclusion resulted in multicollinearity, given that their 
merger variable is zero throughout the sample. Therefore, only the eight merging firms are included. 
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same model. Still, it is important to keep in mind these findings are predicated on a 
bivariate specification, which assumes that profitability is only driven by mergers and 
acquisitions. While we know this assumption is likely not accurate since numerous 
factors influence firm performance and profitability, “deducing the effects of these 
omitted variables is difficult to fully accomplish since what matters is both the relative 
variability of these different variables and their [distinct] dynamic effects” on 
profitability (King and Watson, 1997).  
Table 5: 
  ROA [F(7,120)] ROE [F(7,120)] 
F-Statistic 1.68 1.08 
Prob > F .1213 .3833 
 
Nevertheless, the uniform bivariate findings suggest the presence of common 
factors in the model and the mergers, which I later seek to uncover. Figure 3 plots the 
aggregate profitability for the 10 firms within my sample over the 17-year period. 
Finding the driving forces behind these commonalities requires delving deeper into the 















 The results of my progression can be viewed within Table 6. The model began 
with a specification that solely included control variables and excluded any variable that 
indicated the presence of a merger. This determines a baseline regression from which I 
can estimate how much profits are driven by factors other than mergers. As demonstrated 
by regression 6.1, the significance of this control variable regression implies that many of 
the included factors do indeed influence petroleum corporation profitability. For instance, 
in the ROA specification the total number of barrels imported, the Arca oil index, and the 
amount of exposure to crude oil production all appear to be significant factors affecting 
firm profitability. The coefficient of .35 on the imported oil variable signifies that for 
every hundred million barrels imported the return on assets of petroleum corporations 
will increase by approximately .35 points. While one may assume that increases in 
imported oil provide evidence of foreign firms outcompeting domestic production, my 
regression implies this is not the case. Rather, the increases in imports are indicative of 
higher domestic demand, from which domestic and foreign production both respond. 
 Meanwhile, the estimate of .12 on the Arca oil index variable implies that 
regardless of a merger, in the case of a one percent increase in the index, the profitability 
of firms will also increase, but by .12 points. Because the Arca index is designed to 
capture the aggregate movements of the petroleum industry, this result implies that as the 
industry experiences overall profitability, the firms in my sample do as well.  
At the same time, the significance of the production variable suggests that for 
every hundred million barrels of oil produced domestically, firm profitability rises by 
5.06 points. One possible explanation for this is that the more production surrounding a 
firm, the more likely it is to be in an area where exploration and attainment costs are low 
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while production capabilities are high. While this would imply the firm experiences 
greater competition, it would also likely allow for profits to be driven up at a faster rate. 
Taking these three factors into account, the firms in my sample appear to react positively 
to increases in imported oil, industry wide profitability, and surges in domestic crude oil 
production. Speculation leads to the conclusion that these factors may be representative 
of increases in domestic demand for oil and transitively, times of higher profits for 
petroleum corporations. These findings are also somewhat supported by the results of the 
ROE regression (6.3), where similar signs and coefficients are achieved, just not at the 
same level of significance. Clearly, petroleum industry profitability does not follow a 
random walk but rather, is driven by underlying common factors and correlations. This 
allows me to verify my second hypothesis that economic and firm specific characteristics 
are correlated with the profitability of firms and the effects of mergers and acquisitions. 
Next, I included merger specific variables within the regression (6.2) to answer 
the central question of this paper: how do mergers affect profitability? The initial, simple 
indicator variable, merger, with a coefficient of -.41 came up insignificant. While this 
suggests that firm profitability declines during the year the merger occurs, possibly due to 
complications and uncertainty that stems from the integration of such massive 
corporations, it is not a significant variable on its own. However, much of a merger’s 
effects are captured by the lagged merger variable, which measures the specific effect of 
the merger in the following year (once it has had the time to be completed). Here, the 
statistically significant coefficient of 4.05 on the one-year lagged merger variable implies 
that the in the subsequent year, the firm’s return on assets increases by 4.05 points. This 
represents a 64 percent increase when compared to the average ROA (6.37) of this 
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sample. The initial negative plunge followed by a very significant, large, and positive 
effect on profitability is also substantiated by the ROE regression (6.4), where the 
statistically significant coefficients of -5.17 and 7.12,
9
 imply similar profitability 
responses to these mergers. These one-year lag rises in profitability may be due to 
immediate synergy and production efficiency achieved through the mergers and are likely 
characteristic of future gains attained from the transactions.  
Table 6: 
 ROA ROE 










































































































Significance levels: Italics=0.10; *=0.05; **=0.01 
  
The commonality of the signs and significance between the ROA and ROE 
regressions is also very informative of the uniform effect petroleum mergers and 
                                                        
9 The magnitudes of the coefficients in the ROE specification will tend to be larger than those of the ROA 
specification as returns on equity are much more variable and volatile. 
17 
 
acquisitions may have. This lag uniformity implies the existence of additional similarities 
amongst petroleum industry restructuring and may suggest the emergence of long run 
positive effects from mergers and acquisitions. Regardless, the aggregate positive effects 
of mergers in both the ROA and ROE regressions allow me to confirm my first 
hypothesis and conclude that mergers and acquisitions appear to have a positive overall 
effect on firm profitability. 
The progression of Table 6 also offers further evidence for my second hypothesis 
that economic and firm specific characteristics help explain the performance of the firm 
and of such transactions. Even as some variables, such as “location”, contradict both my 
sign and significance expectations, they all offer insight into the underlying correlations 
and motivations behind firm profitability. The overall significance of each regression (6.1 
through 6.4) indicates that while variables may be individually insignificant, they are able 
to jointly produce an accurate, representative model. 
The final stage of my progression culminated with regressions 7.1 and 7.2, which 
seek to analyze how mergers and acquisitions affect the profitability of participating 
firms and particularly, competitor firms. Expanding regressions 6.2 and 6.4 to include 
variables analyzing the effect on competitors allows for three substantive conclusions to 
be drawn. The first conclusion (i) is that the aforementioned results regarding the merger 
variables are largely upheld. Here, in regressions 7.1 and 7.2, we see the signs, 
coefficients, and significances are very similar to the previous regressions. This evidence 
again confirms my initial hypothesis that petroleum mergers and acquisitions appear to 
increase the profitability of participating firms.  
18 
 
At the same time, analyzing the effect of mergers on other firms in this sample 
may serve as a proxy for how restructuring influences the profitability of rival firms or 
the industry as a whole. As previously mentioned, this paper only uses three effect 
variables for four mergers and acquisitions due to the fact that the Valero-Premcor 
merger occurred during the same year as the Chevron-Unocal acquisition. Therefore, had 
it included an effect variable for each of these two mergers, these variables would simply 
be measuring how the mergers influenced each other, and nothing else. This consequence 
would be unavoidable as the variables’ data series are essentially mirror images. To 
prevent this, one variable must be dropped from the regression and thus, only one merger 
effect can be measured. This paper selected to use the Chevron-Unocal merger variable 
as its size and strength is likely to have a more significant effect than the smaller, Valero-
Premcor transaction. 
In regression 7.1, two of the three “effect on competitor firms” variables appear to 
have a statistically significant, negative effect on the profitability of other rival 
companies. These two variables are the effect of the ExxonMobil and Chevron-Unocal 
mergers. As the coefficients of -5.12 and -3.29, respectively, demonstrate a negative 
effect on the profitability of other firms in my sample, I am able to arrive at my second 
conclusion (ii): since the largest firms, and the only super-majors
10
 in the sample, 
participated in these two mergers, it appears as though mergers involving the largest, 
multinational petroleum corporations influence the profitability of competitor firms, and 
possibly the whole industry, negatively. The coefficients of -12.07 and -9.79 within the 
ROE regression (7.2) also support this finding and conclusion. These results may be a 
                                                        
10 A super-major is one of the world’s five largest publicly owned petroleum corporations. 
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consequence of the attainment of an overwhelming share of the market as these 
corporations expand to new heights. Smaller firms may simply lack the resources to 
compete with such empires.  
Table 7: 
 ROA ROE 




















































































Significance levels: Italics=0.10; *=0.05; **=0.01 
  
 Meanwhile, the third conclusion (iii) of my analysis isolates a completely 
different trend: the effect of the ConocoPhillips merger, with coefficients of 1.11 and       
-3.16 in the ROA and ROE specifications, each have less of a negative and significant 
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effect on the performance of competitor firms within this sample. Because specific 
motivations driving mergers and acquisitions are often convoluted in the eye of the 
public, to some, the desire of smaller corporations to restructure possibly suggests an 
attempt to avoid potential inefficiencies, failures, or future demises. These mergers may 
occur out of need rather than desire and thus, could have less potential to succeed or to 
damage competitor profitability. However, because the coefficient on the effect of the 
ConocoPhillips merger is negative in the ROE regression, it is feasible that this result 
provides further evidence of the negative effect on rival profitability that these 
transactions generate. Although these results provide mixed evidence for my hypothesis, 
I can conclude that smaller mergers seem to have less of a negative, influential effect on 
the profitability of competitor firms than larger, super-major mergers do. While further 
enquiry is necessary in order to determine the precise effect of these mergers on other 
firms, I feel comfortable postulating that the aggregate negative nature of my results 
implies large mergers and acquisitions have a detrimental effect on the profitability of 
firms not participating in the transaction.
11
 
 While this paper finds significant evidence regarding the effect of mergers and 
acquisitions on participant and rival profitability, it is important to keep in mind its 
shortcomings. (i) The span of my sample is relatively limited as it only includes the 
results and implications of four major mergers, from which, the paper makes speculative 
generalizations about oil industry restructuring. While the mergers included are all rather 
different, they are also very characteristic of the sector. I believe this enables them to be 
                                                        
11 My research also included a “Years since Specific Merger” variable, which measured the years since 
each specific merger in my sample for every firm that had not participated in the merger. I hoped to gain 
insight into how differently, or similarly, each of my four mergers affected the distinct firms in my sample 
over a period of time. Thus, generating the effect as the years progressed, rather than just the aggregate. For 
the most part, the results proved to be insignificant and were largely uninformative. 
21 
 
representative of industry restructuring as a whole. (ii) There is much debate upon the 
question of what the best metric for profitability is. My paper only uses two out of the 
many important and informative valuation measures. However, recent inquiry has 
validated the merit and scope of return on assets and thus, I feel comfortable utilizing it 
as the predominant measure of profitability within this paper. It is important to keep these 
caveats in mind when evaluating the results of this study. 
 
Conclusion 
Through the incorporation of four mergers and acquisitions that are unique and 
yet, simultaneously, characteristic of the aggregate restructuring within the oil industry, I 
have investigated how such reorganization affects the profitability of both participating 
and competitor firms. Furthermore, I have isolated distinct economic conditions and firm 
traits that are correlated with the performance of these mergers and the profitability of 
these firms.  
My findings allow me to conclude that when proxies, such as ROA and ROE,
12
 
are used to measure profitability, evidence suggests that mergers have a positive net 
                                                        
12 This study also aimed to incorporate a regression that measured profitability through the percentage 
change in stock price. The results of this regression could not support all of the aforementioned findings. 
While some similar trends and implications were evident in the stock price data and its results, none were 
significant or substantial enough to be included or reported. This is likely due to the large fluctuations in 
stock prices. Figure 4 in Appendix D illustrates these fluctuations in stock price for acquiring firms, target 
firms, and firms that did not participate in a merger over the 17-year period. The aberrations make 
attempting to create an informative and encompassing regression, very difficult. The lack of specific results 
may be consequence of the fact that stock prices are subject to a wider range of influences than returns on 
assets or equity. Motivations behind stock price changes include human patterns and predictions, 
unexplainable shifts, and many similar pressures; all of which are subject to extreme error and variation. 
This lack of results does not harm this paper, as a stock price regression would largely measure the 
market’s prediction of profitability, rather than actual internal firm profitability. Still, it is clear that 
commonalities do exist within stock price alterations. Isolating the motivations behind these changes and 
their relationship to mergers and acquisitions will require increasing the span of this study. Only then can I 
hope to uncover the effects of mergers and acquisitions on stock prices.  
22 
 
effect on profitability. It appears that the production and synergy gains outweigh any 
costs, complications, and inefficiencies that may arise through the merger and acquisition 
process. This positive effect is largely generated in the year following the merger and 
counters any initial declines in profitability the firm may experience during the 
transaction. 
My results also provide evidence that when the largest petroleum corporations 
participated in mergers, the restructuring had a very negative effect on the profitability of 
competing firms, and possibly on the industry. This is likely a consequence of smaller 
firms’ inability to compete with the overwhelming empire that these larger corporations 
create through merging and acquiring. Meanwhile, the restructuring of smaller firms had 
a much less negative and significant effect on the industry. Perhaps this is due to the 
broad variability in the performance of smaller mergers and a lower rate of success or 
influence. 
Similarly to previous papers (Hyde), a goal of this study was to obtain an 
understanding of how these mergers affected the profitability and competitiveness of the 
industry, thereby allowing us to formulate better policy in anticipation of future mergers 
and acquisitions. Given the significance of the results within this paper, contemplating 
their ramifications should enable one to contrive policy implications and pass judgment 
on the performance of the FTC. Evidence that these mergers and acquisitions have a 
detrimental effect on rivals suggests that the FTC may not be doing a sufficient job in its 
investigation and enforcement process. This would imply that stricter regulations and 
requirements are merited during these transactions.  




Yet, corporations only merge and acquire if they believe it to be advantageous for 
their profitability or detrimental for others. As one increases its own profits, it only 
naturally follows that another is likely to bear the consequences. The FTC should not 
prevent firms from profiting simply because others are unable to compete. So, while the 
policy implications of these results may suggest the need for more stringent regulation, 
the question of how negative these effects are must be answered first. If the negative 
effects on rival firms are only moderate in magnitude then the FTC is doing its job 
adequately. However, if the negative effects end up severely harming competition in the 
long run, causing the consequences to fall not only on rival firms, but also on consumers, 
then tighter oversight of these mergers is necessary. Unfortunately, the answer to this 
question lies beyond the scope of this paper and will require further research and insight. 
Regardless, whatever the case may be surrounding this paper’s findings and their 
implications, the data and results of this study undoubtedly contain evidence of the 
aggregate, uniform effects within U.S. petroleum mergers and acquisitions. It is 















         





 The merger was agreed upon and announced in December 1998. The 
transaction was then completed in November 1999 for $81 billion. In order to gain FTC 
approval, Exxon and Mobil sold approximately 2,400 retail stations across the country. 
This merger was looked upon as a friendly merger of near equals; it integrated two of the 
largest public petroleum corporations of the time. The transaction was a horizontal 
merger as it was comprised of direct competitors. The merging of all production and 
retail processes for the two firms resulted in ExxonMobil establishing itself as the largest 
public petroleum corporation in the world. It hoped to bring about greater efficiencies in 
the face of decreased crude oil prices. Interestingly, the merger also “brings back together 
two pieces of the former Standard Oil Co., the Rockefeller-run oil titan that was split 




 The merger was agreed upon in November 2001. It was then 
completed on August 30
th
, 2002 for $15.12 billion. The merger resulted in the creation of 
the U.S.’s third largest oil producer. This transaction was also viewed as a friendly 
horizontal merger of equals, specifically of two mid-sized corporations. The smaller size 
of the participants meant the FTC investigation was expected to culminate with few 
regulatory obstacles or stipulations. Nevertheless, the FTC did require some divestitures, 
as it feared the merger might reduce competition. “The $750 million in savings expected 





 The merger was announced in April 2005. Chevron fully absorbed 
Unocal by early August for $17.9 billion. The transactions boosted Chevron’s exploration 
                                                        
13 All Information for the Exxon Mobil text box was obtained through “Exxon-Mobil Merger Done” 
(1999). 
14
 All Information for this text box was obtained through “Phillips, Conoco Set Merger” (2002) and “With 
Conditions, FTC Approves Merger of Phillips and Conoco” (2002). 
15 All Information for this text box was obtained through “Chevron Gets OK to Acquire Unocal” (2005) 
and Baker, David R. (2005). 
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and production means, but had no effect on retail. The acquisition was expected to 
“increase [Chevron’s] reserves 15 percent and swell its daily production to 2.8 million 
barrels.” Unlike the other mergers within this sample, “the deal almost didn't happen. For 
months, Chevron battled a rival bid from China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 
which coveted Unocal's Asian oil reserves.” The foreign firm’s competitive bid reached, 
$18.5 billion, $600 million more than Chevron’s offer. Had the “bid from CNOOC, 
partly owned by the Chinese government, [not] provoked an outcry in Congress, where 
politicians view China's growing thirst for oil as a threat,” it may have succeeded in 
purchasing Unocal. While Unocal seemed to welcome either acquirer, fierce political 
criticism forced China National to rescind its bid and Chevron’s offer was the only option 
left. Upon FTC review, Chevron was forced to concede its new ownership of Unocal’s 




 The friendly merger was agreed upon in April 2005. It was then 
completed in September 2005 for a value of approximately $8 billion. Valero began to 
take action on the merger as 2005 seemed to be “shaping up to be another year of record 
earnings.” The transaction was predicted to add around 14% to earnings per share. The 
companies also believed it would result in “$350 million in annual cost-savings in the 
second year after closing, including lower administrative and interest costs, lower crude 
oil costs due to purchasing leverage and operational improvements.” The deal makes 
Valero the largest refiner of crude oil in North America as it surpassed ExxonMobil 
Corp. The FTC reviewed the proposed transaction and allowed it without any further 




Table 1 (continued): Statistics for the entire sample 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ROA 6.37 5.82 -12.59 19.83 
ROE 14.58 19.88 -168.98 58.97 
MERG 0.43 0.50 0 1 
MERG1 0.38 0.49 0 1 
POIL 14.40 27.51 -41.54 65.40 
IMP 42.78 5.06 32.25 50.06 
ARCA 10.99 16.58 -25.18 41.68 
PROD 0.38 0.22 0 0.58 
POLT 0.53 0.50 0 1 
LOC 0.38 0.49 0 1 
XOM 0.61 0.49 0 1 
COP 0.47 0.50 0 1 
CVX 0.33 0.47 0 1 
 
                                                        





Table 2 (continued): Sample statistics before the occurrence of a merger 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ROA 4.47 4.4 -12.59 14.3 
ROE 12.27 23.47 -168.98 58.97 
MERG 0 0 0 0 
MERG1 0 0 0 0 
POIL 11.66 28.71 -41.54 65.4 
IMP 40.5 4.97 32.25 50.06 
ARCA 10.95 13.71 -25.18 41.68 
PROD 0.29 0.23 0 0.58 
POLT 0.65 0.48 0 1 
LOC 0.53 0.5 0 1 
XOM 0.58 0.5 0 1 
COP 0.33 0.47 0 1 
CVX 0.15 0.35 0 1 
 
 
Table 3 (continued): Sample statistics after the occurrence of a merger 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Minimum Maximum 
ROA 8.85 6.51 -11.44 19.83 
ROE 17.58 13.49 -29.64 38.48 
MERG 1 0 1 1 
MERG1 0.89 0.31 0 1 
POIL 17.97 25.61 -41.54 65.4 
IMP 45.72 3.41 39.61 50.06 
ARCA 11.05 19.79 -25.18 41.68 
PROD 0.5 0.12 0.2 0.58 
POLT 0.38 0.49 0 1 
LOC 0.19 0.39 0 1 
XOM 0.65 0.48 0 1 
COP 0.65 0.48 0 1 









 ROA ROE MERG MERG1 POIL IMP ARCA PROD POLT LOC XOM COP CVX 
ROA 1             
ROE 0.76 1            
MERG 0.37 0.13 1           
MERG1 0.37 0.14 0.91 1          
POIL 0.27 0.21 0.11 0.08 1         
IMP 0.41 0.27 0.51 0.47 0.25 1        
ARCA 0.43 0.26 0 -0.06 0.36 0.22 1       
PROD 0.20 0.07 0.49 0.45 0.06 0.24 -0.02 1      
POLT -0.29 -0.23 -0.27 -0.22 -0.12 -0.76 -0.17 -0.14 1     
LOC -0.11 -0.05 -0.35 -0.33 -0.04 -0.13 0 -0.8 0.06 1    
XOM -0.15 -0.04 0.07 0.04 0.26 0.54 -0.09 -0.04 -0.36 0.13 1   
COP 0.27 0.08 0.31 0.31 0.10 0.59 0 0.07 -0.43 0.06 0.27 1  
CVX 0.11 -0.02 0.44 0.47 0.05 0.49 0.05 0.36 -0.14 -0.37 0.20 0.39 1 
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